Glance into Renegotiation by Gebbie, Theia A.
Woman C.P.A. 
Volume 8 Issue 2 Article 6 
2-1946 
Glance into Renegotiation 
Theia A. Gebbie 
Follow this and additional works at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/wcpa 
 Part of the Accounting Commons, and the Women's Studies Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Gebbie, Theia A. (1946) "Glance into Renegotiation," Woman C.P.A.: Vol. 8 : Iss. 2 , Article 6. 
Available at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/wcpa/vol8/iss2/6 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Archival Digital Accounting Collection at eGrove. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Woman C.P.A. by an authorized editor of eGrove. For more information, please 
contact egrove@olemiss.edu. 
Theia A. Gebbie is a member of the Cleveland Chapter 
of the American Society of Women Accountants. Miss 
Gebbie is a financial analyst on Renegotiation for the 
Cleveland Ordnance District and has been affiliated with 
Renegotiation since January, 1943. Her prior experience 
was on the accounting, statistical, and clerical staffs of 
industrial concerns, social agencies, and the Cuyahoga 
County tax office. Miss Gebbie is also a member of the 
National Association of Cost Accountants and the National 
Writers’ Club.
A GLANCE INTO RENEGOTIATION
By THEIA A. GEBBIE
Forerunners of Renegotiation
The basis for most of the thinking on 
wartime profit control was the recognition 
that the people of this country were deter­
mined to prevent excessive profits in 
World War II. War profits always arouse 
public ire. The recollection of experiences 
during and after World War I convinced 
industry that if some businesses were al­
lowed to make undue profits from war, all 
industry suffered.
Between February, 1919, and April 28, 
1942, there were about 170 bills and reso­
lutions introduced into Congress designed 
to reduce or eliminate profits on war pro­
duction.
Following the United States’ entrance 
into World War II on December 8, 1941, 
the procurement of war materials expanded 
rapidly. Many manufacturers were urged 
to undertake the manufacture of articles 
never produced before and subject to fre­
quent change. Others undertook articles 
new to them, or increased production to 
amounts far beyond their previous small 
quantities.
The demands of war reflected through 
(1) revisions of specifications, (2) changes 
in quantities and rates of delivery, (3) 
shortages of materials and equipment, and 
(4) manpower problems. It was practically 
impossible to forecast costs so that reason­
able profits might be estimated.
Since most early war contract prices had 
their origin in small quantity production, 
the great increases in the volume of pro­
duction and the rapid improvements in 
methods frequently brought profits far 
beyond those anticipated when contracts 
were originally made, and left many con­
tractors with profits which they should 
not and did not wish to retain.
The cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts were 
widely used in the beginning, but even 
then it was believed that any flat profit 
limitation tended to promote inefficiency, 
was a stumbling block in the procurement 
program, and was sadly inequitable.
Renegotiation Becomes Law
The enactment of the renegotiation law 
as Section 403 of the Sixth Supplemental 
National Defense Appropriation Act of 
1942 was finally the result of certain sug­
gestions and proposals made by the pro­
curement services of the armed forces. This 
was effective as of April 28, 1942.
Later Revisions
During 1943 the renegotiation law and 
its administration were examined by Con­
gress. Four Congressional committees held
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public hearings and in executive sessions 
examined carefully many renegotiation 
cases, particularly the cases of those who 
complained about the administration of 
the law.
As a result of these studies, a revision 
of the renegotiation legislation was initi­
ated by the Committee on Ways and 
Means, of the House of Representatives, in 
September, 1943. and further considered 
by the Finance Committee of the Senate. 
This legislation, which was incorporated in 
the Revenue Act of 1943, became law on 
February 25, 1944. The revision followed 
closely the concept and scope of the 1942 
law and, in general, strengthened and 
clarified the fundamental policies.
There were certain changes, however. 
One of the principal revisions was the ex­
emption measured by sales volume which 
was increased from $100,000 in 1942 to 
$500,000 in 1943. While it was known that 
excessive profits existed in many smaller 
companies, it was recognized that all con­
tractors could not be examined and rene­
gotiated in a reasonable period. Also, the 
amount of excessive profits involved in 
these companies was usually not sufficient 
to warrant the effort and cost of renego­
tiation.
Over-all Method Adopted
The over-all method of renegotiation 
was adopted. This procedure permitted the 
contractor’s profits on his entire war busi­
ness to be examined for a specific fiscal 
period in order to reach an agreement for 
eliminating excessive profits on all con­
tracts and subcontracts as a group and for 
that period. In this way, contractors might 
offset their losses on certain contracts 
against profits on other contracts during 
the same period.
The over-all method also reduced the 
administrative burden and saved time for 
the contractors and the Government. The 
use of the fiscal period for renegotiation 
facilitated the use of the regular financial 
and accounting material of contractors.
War Contracts Board
The authority and discretion to adminis­
ter the Renegotiation Act of 1943 was con­
ferred upon the War Contracts Board with 
power of delegation. The Board is com­
posed of six members, one each from the 
War Department, the Navy Department, 
the Treasury, the Maritime Commission or 
the War Shipping Administration, the Re­
construction Finance Corporation, and the 
War Production Board.
The Board may, in its discretion, review 
any determination made by any officer or 
agency to which its powers have been dele­
gated, and has the authority to make a 
redetermination of the amount of exces­
sive profits. However, where a determina­
tion with respect to the amount of exces­
sive profits of a contractor or subcontractor 
is embodied in an agreement between the 
contractor or subcontractor and a duly 
authorized representative of the Board, 
such agreement is conclusive according to 
its terms and shall not be subject to re­
view by the Board.
Assignment for Renegotiation
Assignments of contractors are ordinarily 
made to the Department or Service be­
lieved to have the predominant interest in 
the assigned contractor’s renegotiable bus­
iness. Some assignments are made, how­
ever, by considerations of geographic con­
venience and other reasons. For instance, 
it has been found advantageous to assign 
concerns which produce the same or simi­
lar products to the same Department or 
Service.
The War Contracts Board may cancel 
the assignment of any contractor on the 
ground that it clearly appears that no ex­
cessive profits were realized by the contrac­
tor. However, cancellation of an assignment 
does not constitute a formal clearance. If 
a contractor desires a clearance of its re­
sponsibilities under the Act, renegotiation 
must be completed and a clearance issued 
in the regular manner.
Determination of 
Renegotiable Business
In order to determine whether a con­
tractor’s profits received or accrued under 
renegotiable contracts and subcontracts are 
excessive, it is necessary first to determine 
the amount of renegotiable business and 
the profits thereon.
It is the contractor’s responsibility to 
make the segregation of sales and the allo­
cation of costs and expenses between re­
negotiable and nonrenegotiable business. 
However, the segregation and allocation 
must be satisfactory to the Department 
conducting the renegotiation.
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The Renegotiation Act prescribes what 
type of contracts are subject to renegoti­
ation. In practice, there often is difficulty 
in tracing and identifying all sales with 
exactness, especially subcontract sales 
where the products are far removed from 
the end use. Each contractor must decide 
what method will result in the most equi­
table segregation of sales.
Often there is more than one method 
available for segregating sales between re­
negotiable and nonrenegotiable business. 
In that event the methods available for 
equitably allocating the cost of sales are 
carefully considered before a final deter­
mination is made as to the method to use 
in segregating sales. In general, some such 
classifications for segregating sales and allo­
cating costs and expenses are:
(1) Industry, customer or customer 
group.
(2) Product or group of products.
(3) End use classifications as shown 
on reports to the War Production 
Board.
(4) Division, department or plant, 
wherein the extent of renegotiation 
can be determined.
(5) Periods of the year, where the per­
cent of business subject to renego­
tiation varies with the period.
Determination of Excessive Profits
After the profits pertaining to renegoti­
able business have been determined, there 
must be a determination of the amount, if 
any, which is excessive under the Renego­
tiation Act.
Under war conditions the Government is 
the nation’s principal buyer. Its purchases 
are paid for by taxation and borrowing. 
The lower the costs of production and the 
prices paid directly or indirectly by the 
Government, the less will be the financial 
burden on the people of the country. Since 
prices are composed of costs and profits, 
-renegotiation is in effect an over-all repric­
ing. Where prices have been so high as to 
produce excessive profits, the adjustment 
of prices may be accomplished through an 
adjustment of the profits included therein.
All the facts applicable to the contrac­
tor’s business for the year being renegoti­
ated are examined and considered. The 
profit considered is that before Federal 
taxes on income. There is no formula for 
determining excessive profits; it is a matter 
of judgment. Some of the principles given 
consideration are:
(1) The relationship of profit to sales. 
It is generally recognized that sales to 
the Government under war contracts 
should not result in profits as great as 
those which might be earned on a similar 
volume of peacetime business acquired 
in a freely competitive market. Profits 
on war business are paid involuntarily 
out of taxes by citizens.
(2) The efficiency of the contractor 
with regard to the quantity and quality 
of production, the reduction of costs and 
economical use of materials, facilities, 
and manpower.
(3) Corresponding profits in prewar 
base years of the contractor and for the 
industry. (Generally, the years 1936- 
1939 are used as a base period.) The rate 
of profit made on peacetime business is 
not necessarily a basis for profits to be 
made on war contracts, but it is signifi­
cant.
(4) The effect of volume on costs and 
profits. In general, the margin of profit 
on expanded war sales should be reduced 
in reasonable relationship to the ex­
panded volume.
(5) The varying characteristics among 
several classes of production or between 
peacetime and war business; the com­
plexity of the manufacturing technique, 
and the character and extent of the sub­
contracting.
(6) The amount and source of public 
and private capital employed and the 
net worth. This concerns the proportion 
of the plant or equipment or materials 
supplied by Government agencies or 
other contractors, and the amount of 
facilities covered by certificates of neces­
sity. Where a large part of the capital 
or facilities is furnished, the contrac­
tor’s contribution tends to become more 
of management only.
(7) The risk incident to reasonable 
pricing policies. The contractor who 
overprices has taken little responsibility 
for increases in cost of materials and 
wages, guaranties of quality and per­
formance of the product, or any such 
risk.
(8) Contribution to the war effort, 
including inventive and developmental 
contribution and cooperation with the 
Government and other contractors in 
supplying technical assistance.
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Elimination of Excessive Profits
When an agreement has been reached 
with a contractor for the elimination of 
excessive profits as a result of renegotia­
tion, such agreement is evidenced by the 
execution of a renegotiation agreement. 
In most instances the contractor has been 
assessed Federal income and excess profits 
taxes on the profits to be eliminated, and 
a credit equal to the amount of such taxes 
is allowed against the refund to be made 
by the contractor. This refund may be 
made by the contractor in a single payment 
or in installments as the agreement may 
provide.
Discussion
The surface view of renegotiation pic­
tured above deals primarily with the co­
operative contractors, those who realize 
that the motivating idea is ethical and 
fair. There are some non-cooperative con­
tractors, and there are some contractors 
who consider the treatment they have re­
ceived under renegotiation to be unfair. 
In such cases a unilateral determination 
may be issued involving subsequent review 
by the War Contracts Board and the right 
to appeal to the Tax Court.
In the main, however, renegotiation is 
accepted as an expedient—an attempt to 
correct some of the difficulties in relation 
to excessive earnings from war. Until com­
petitive conditions are again established, 
renegotiation is somewhat of a leveling 
agent and accepted by some contractors 
as such.
Renegotiation has not tried to determine 
what are fair and accurate costs. The 
underlying thought and approach to rene­
gotiation concerns the elimination of ex­
cessive and inordinate profits. 
PRONOUNCE IT CORRECTLY
By JENNIE M. PALEN, C.P.A.
Accounting, like all learned professions, 
has a technical vocabulary. All good ac­
countants know this vocabulary and the 
nuances of its meanings. Astonishingly 
enough, however, some of the top-grade 
accountants do not pronounce some of 
these words correctly.
As an example let us take the word 
amortize, a word which every accountant 
uses over and over again. Dictionaries agree 
that the accent is on the second syllable. 
Yet in accounting offices and even on the 
floor and platform of accounting society 
meetings one hears it constantly pro­
nounced with the accent on the first syl­
lable. The related noun amortization is 
properly pronounced a-mor" ti-za' tion, 
with the primary accent on the fourth 
syllable and the secondary accent on the 
second syllable, but we seldom hear it that 
way. We hear, instead, am” or-ti-za' tion, 
with the secondary accent incorrectly 
placed on the first syllable.
Then there is the word used in describ­
ing that part of the accountant’s report 
which details its contents. The word is 
presentation and the e in the first syllable 
is short; thus, prez” en-ta' tion. But do 
most of us pronounce it that way? We do 
not! Ninety-nine percent of us say 
pree” zen-ta' tion! We are not, of course, 
alone in this error. Many an award pre­
sented at distinguished affairs is described 
by the presiding officer and by the radio 
commentators who subsequently report the 
affair as a pree” zen-taf tion. So far no dic­
tionary has given this pronunciation the 
accolade of its approval.
The words comparable and comparably 
do yeoman service for the accounting pro­
fession. A high ranking government official 
recently pronounced these words com- 
par' a-ble and com-par' a-bly in an able 
speech which was eagerly listened to by 
accountants. Webster says com' par-a-ble 
and com' par-a-bly. Many accountants are 
guilty of mispronouncing both.
There is also the word finance. The ac­
cent is on the second syllable. But far, far 
too often do we hear it pronounced 
fye' nance. At an important public dinner 
held recently a minister, one of the prin­
cipal speakers, was guilty of this error. Let 
us not be smug about that, however. Min­
isters are not expected to know as much 
about finance as we.
Ministers also have been known to trip, 
along with some of us, on the word 
resources, but this word, too, is one of the 
tools of our profession and WE should 
know that the accent is on the second 
syllable, not on the first.
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